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1. May I say in a simplified way that your academic career has developed from analytical 
interpretations of Plato’s metaphysics to the approach to the philosophy as the art of living? In 
my view these are two different conceptions of philosophy: analytical which is separated from 
life of individuals and ethical which is connected with our lives. Can you try to explain how 
or why you have changed your understanding of philosophy?  
<A. Nehamas> Given the emphasis on Plato’s metaphysics and epistemology, in which I still 
have a deep interest, it took me a while (and in this Nietzsche was a great help) to realize that 
Plato’s “systematic” philosophy is not a goal in its own right. That aspect of his philosophy is, 
of course, crucial to his project and requires serious study. But in the end it is subordinated to 
the search for the good life, which for Plato includes an understanding of these subjects, not 
for their own sake but for their contribution to the correct attitude toward how one can live 
well. Once this became clear to me, I turned to what I now think is the main concern, not just 
of Plato but of all ancient philosophy.   
 
2. The main stream of contemporary interpretations of Ancient philosophy is analytical in its 
character. We are publishing a lot of extended readings of Plato’s dialogues without an effort 
to find a therapeutic signification of the Socratic dialogues. Likewise we prefer Plato as “more 
philosophical” to the other writers of Sokratikoi logoi (e.g. Phaedo, Aeschines, Antisthenes, 
Xenophon, or Dio of Prusa, Maximus of Tyre, Libanius etc.). Do you think that the art of So-
cratic dialogues consists more in the meaning of philosophy as therapeia than in theoretical 
analysis of ethical issues? And how we can show it to analytical interpreters of the Socratic 
dialogues?  
<A. Nehamas> The understanding of the Socratic dialogues as incitements to “the care of the 
self” is important for everyone who tries to come to terms with Plato and his fellow Socratics.  
It is a mistake to think that the arguments of these works and their practical concerns are irrel-
evant to one another. Even if philosophy is thought of therapeia, part of the “medicine” that 
brings that therapeia about includes, as an essential part, the dialectical and argumentative 
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structure of the dialogues. My own sense is that it is impossible to understand or appreciate 
either element in the project of ancient philosophy. I am as dissatisfied with approaches that 
ignore the ethical goals of the dialogues as I am dispirited by efforts to show that the argu-
ments are of no significance and even designed to mislead their audience into a “shallow” 
understanding of Plato’s real purpose. Argument may not be philosophy’s exclusive concern 
but the sort of investigation they involve is essential to its purpose. 
 
3. Michel Foucault says in his lectures at the Collège de France, 1982-1983 (The Government 
of Self and Others) that “philosophy finds its reality in the practice of philosophy understood 
as the set of practices through which the subject has a relationship to itself, elaborates itself, 
and works on itself. The work of the self on self – that is the reality of philosophy.” Late Fou-
cault as we know perceives philosophy as askēsis, and he tries to transfer very Ancient con-
cept of philosophizing to his own work (as it is noted by Paul Veyne). Surprisingly (surely for 
some rigorous Platonists) Foucault reads Plato by this way when he interprets his comprehen-
sion of pragmata. Do you think that we can read Plato’s dialogues as instigation to the per-
manent labor of the self on itself without endeavor to confirm the truth of being generally 
valid and normative for all reasonable individuals?  
<A. Nehamas> Michel Foucault was a great reader of Plato. In my opinion, however, he 
overemphasized an individualist account of Plato’s philosophy. I suspect that such an individ-
ualist account is a possible interpretation of his Socratic dialogues but not of works like the 
Phaedo, the Republic, or the Laws. In these works, Plato, I believe, is engaged in a much 
vaster, socially situation, project. Still, Foucault’s reading of the Platonic Socrates is exciting, 
productive, and inspiring.   
 
4. One of your favorite philosophers, Friedrich Nietzsche is not very friendly to Socrates in 
his writings. On the other hand Socrates is important example of how to live an examined life 
for Ancients similarly as Nietzsche is important figure for contemporary intellectuals. Tension 
between Socrates and Nietzsche follows maybe from differences between Ancient and Mod-
ern worlds. Do you think that Nietzsche is more important figure for our speculations about 
philosophical life than Socrates (interpreted by contemporary philosophers)? What can we 
learn from Nietzsche about living as an art? Of course if we are aware of the art of living as 
an ability to become different which cannot be taught at the end. 
<A. Nehamas> Nietzsche’s attitude toward Socrates goes through several changes: an early 
period of passionate attacks (mainly in The Birth of Tragedy) is followed by a truce in works 
like Human, All-Too-Human and Daybreak, disappointment in Book IV of The Gay Science, 
praise in Beyond Good and Evil and a vicious attack in Twilight of the Idols. To me, this am-
bivalence indicates that Nietzsche felt too close to Socrates to be comfortable either simply 
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rejecting him or accepting him wholly. Socrates was for Nietzsche, as he makes clear in Be-
yond Good and Evil, a “genuine philosopher” and a true individual, but his message, as he 
reads him through dialogues like the Republic, was addressed and intended to be binding on 
everyone. Nietzsche could not come to terms with these two aspects of Socrates’ personality 
and influence—he was both too close to and too far from him. Not to mention the fact that 
Socrates, who wrote nothing, was immortalized by the greatest philosopher of all time, while 
Nietzsche himself, who wrote without end, could find, while he was alive at least, no readers, 
and had to be Plato to his own Socrates and Socrates to his own Plato—both author and char-
acter—at the same time. 
 
5. Foucault and Nietzsche are apologists of individualism. I think that Socratic ethics is like-
wise individualistic in its nature. Do you think that philosophical life as an art (accurately 
technē tou biou) is essentially connected with certain forms of individualism? And what is the 
status of philosopher in society then?  
<A. Nehamas> I don’t think that the art of living is essentially individualist. I tend to distin-
guish three versions. One we find in Plato’s Socratic dialogues, in which Socrates seems to 
urge that everyone follow his lead and practice “the care of the self” but has no method from 
proving that they should do so. A second is in Plato’s Republic and the dialogues surrounding 
them. Here, Plato seems to believe that he does have the right considerations to convince eve-
ryone that the care of the self, now codified as the training of the philosopher-kings and the 
rest of his educational system is best for all. And a third, which I am eager to defend, is the 
approach of philosophers like Montaigne and Nietzsche, who believe that there is no single 
way of living well and no method for convincing everyone that they should make an effort to 
do so, if they are not so inclined. Taking the metaphor of art seriously, no one has an obliga-
tion to be an artist—and certainly not to obligation to be a good one. 
 
6. One of the main themes of late Foucault is the care of the self he studies in the texts written 
by Greco-Roman philosophers. Foucault’s death made impossible to continue his study of 
contemporary meaning of the care of the self. What do you think about the possibility of the 
care of the self of the subjects living in modern societies in comparison with the work on the 
self of ancient intellectuals?  
<A. Nehamas> I am afraid we don’t know enough to make such a direct comparison. One 
difference is that I am not convinced, as the ancient philosophers were, that philosophy is the 
only way of leading a good human life. We also don’t share the ancients’ disdain for manual 
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and productive labor (the life of the baunasoi) so that modes of life that the ancients would 
have excluded implicitly from the art of living can now be included among the ways in which 
human beings can lead lives of worth and accomplishment. Conversely, the professionaliza-
tion of philosophy has reduced its role from the central, indeed unique position to which they 
ancient had elevated their practice. There is all the difference in the world between a ancient 
School and a modern Department of philosophy. 
 
7. What does it mean for philosophical thought if we say that to think philosophically is to 
live philosophically? Do you think the philosophical thought cannot be separated from the life 
of the philosopher? What is the sense of such areas of inquiry as epistemology or logic?  
<A. Nehamas> There have always been aspects of philosophy that are not directly linked to 
its practical interests, though they may have implications about them. Much of science, in 
fact, has begun as philosophy. Consider physics, from the Presocratics to Aristotle, and its 
present place in the center of the natural sciences. Consider psychology, which was not sepa-
rated from philosophy until the end of the 19th century, in great part because of the work of 
Wilhelm Wundt and William James. Consider logic, from Whitehead and Russell’s Principia 
Mathematica to contemporary computer science. And consider philosophy of language, now a 
central element in linguistics, and philosophy of mind, with its recent connections to psychol-
ogy and neuroscience. I don’t think we should focus too much on what constitutes philoso-
phy’s “essence.” 
 
8. My last question concerns the aesthetics of existence. How do you understand its meaning 
in relation to both art and ethics?  
<A. Nehamas> Some great works of art are morally benign, others morally neutral, still others 
morally dangerous. The same is true is many great lives. And just as great works of art estab-
lish new ways of doing art, so great lives provide models for new ways of living. I am eager 
to separate aesthetic from moral criteria of success. Aesthetic values promote ideals of dis-
tinction and individuality as opposed to the shared and universal ideals of morality. But aes-
thetic values are still central to human lives and to that extent part of our ethical framework, 
which contains both universal and individual values. A main difference between these two is 
that whereas moral values, impartial as they are, demand that they be obeyed, aesthetic values 
do not. As I said, no one has the obligation to be an artist, much less a good one. Which is 
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why aesthetic accomplishments provoke admiration—the attitude proper to the appreciation 
of art—while moral goodness is more a matter of respect. 
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